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Although most African countries are not
on track to meet the Millennium
Development Goals, Africa had made
steady progress over the last decade,
building the foundations for higher growth
and poverty reduction. This more optimis-
tic picture is now being undermined by
factors outside its control. While the initial
effects of the financial crisis were slow to
materialize in Africa, the impact is now
becoming clear. It is sweeping away
firms, mines, jobs, revenues, and liveli-
hoods; it is in short a full blown develop-
ment crisis. For the first time in a decade
there will be zero growth per capita. This
note provides evidence of the effects, and
suggests action needed. For Africa no
less than elsewhere time is of essence;
decisive remedial action is needed now.
The growth outlook has deteriorated
severely. Macroeconomic balances have
worsened, with many countries facing
widening current account and budget defi-
cits. The crisis is reducing trade, the
mainstay of recent strong growth in Africa.
The expected shortfall in export revenues
amounts to USD251 billion in 2009 and
USD277 billion in 2010 for the continent
as whole, with oil exporters suffering the
largest losses.
In addition to exports, capital inflows are
also declining, including worker remit-
tances and tourism receipts. The stocks
of foreign reserves are running dange-
rously low, with some countries down to
only a few weeks of import cover (for
example, the DRC). This severely jeopar-
dizes the capacity to import even basic
commodities such as food, medical sup-
plies, and agricultural inputs. The poor are
the most affected. The private sector has
been affected by a shortage of liquidity in
international markets, with adverse impact
on trade and investment. International
banks have failed to issue lines of credit
or even confirm pre-committed ones.
Projects have been delayed, and some
have already been cancelled.
African governments have undertaken
measures to minimize the impacts of the
crisis. These include: setting up special
monitoring units, providing fiscal stimulus
packages, revising budget expenditures,
targeting assistance to key sectors,
strengthening the regulation of the ban-
king sector and financial markets, expan-
sionary monetary policy, and foreign
exchange controls to protect the exchan-
ge rate. The key concern is the decelera-
tion of growth, which will disproportionate-
ly affect the poor. It is critically important
to preserve the foundations of growth,
erected through steady policy reforms and
improvements in the investment climate;
this will allow the continent to resume
growth after the crisis.To achieve this goal, it is critical to sustain
adequate levels of investment, especially
in infrastructure. However, Africa’s ability
to do so is severely limited. Pre-existing
resource constraints are being exacerba-
ted by a widening saving-investment gap.
We estimate that just sustaining pre-cri-
sis growth levels in Africa would require
an additional USD50 billion in 2009 and
USD56 billion in 2010. Increasing invest-
ment to the level needed to achieve
higher MDGs-consistent growth rates,
would require an additional USD117 bil-
lion in 2009 and USD 130 billion in 2010.
Previous, repeated, commitments to
increase aid to Africa must be delivered
quickly: speed of access is vital. But that
alone will not be enough if Africa has to
be able to restore a level of growth, suffi-
cient to reduce the levels of poverty. New
and additional resources must be unloc-
ked. Africa must be part of the global res-
ponse to the crisis. Our key recommenda-
tions to the G20 are:
Demonstrate political will and take
action now
• The severity of the crisis calls for the
same sense of urgency as shown in
rescue plans for banks and corporations
in advanced economies.
• Delivering promptly on existing commit-
ments is key to donor credibility as the
continent’s committed development
partners.
• Protect the poor and the vulnerable by
ensuring essential public investment
programmes in health, education, nutri-
tion, and sanitation can be maintained.
• Support social safety nets to protect the
poor, the unemployed and the socially
marginalized.
Provide additional resources
• Commit 0.7 percent of developed
economies own stimulus packages to
assist poorer countries, ensuring new
initiatives are truly additional to existing
aid plans.
• Augmenting the concessional resources
available to the IMF and ease access.
• Increase and sustain investment in
infrastructure at national and regional
level: stimulus packages must primarily
target infrastructure projects.
• Increase the resource envelope for
regional development banks; in
particular agree on an early review of
capital adequacy of the African
Development Bank.
• Increase trade financing by injecting
new resources for specialized facilities,including through regional development
banks.
Increase policy space and flexibility,
and reduce conditionality
• Focusing on results, rather than
prescribing rigid policies and actions,
allowing countries space to respond
according to their particular needs and
circumstances.
• Provide more predictable flows of aid,
with more fast disbursing and front
loaded assistance, consistent with
African priorities.
• Increase flexibility in macroeconomic
frameworks to allow more scope to
balance macroeconomic stability and
the need to stimulate domestic demand.
• Review debt sustainability criteria to
allow access to credit for countries with
adequate potential to borrow.
• Reform procedures in order to promote
more rapid and less conditional aid
delivery.
Promote trade
• Conclude an ambitious and develop-
ment-focused Doha Round, provide Aid
for Trade, and technical assistance.
Increase transparency, accountability,
and equitable representation
• Provide an adequate voice and voting
rights to African countries in IFIs and
major global governing bodies.
• Tackle tax havens and assist in the
recovery of Africa’s stolen wealth;
enforce transparency in financial
transactions in banking systems in
advanced economies to deter illegal
transfers of funds from African
countries.1. Introduction
1.1 The crisis has come at a time when
Africa is turning the corner, steadily buil-
ding the foundations for higher growth
and poverty reduction. But still, most
African countries are lagging behind in
terms of meeting their MDGs targets. The
optimistic growth outlook is now undermi-
ned by factors outside Africa’s control.
While the initial effects of the crisis were
slow to materialize, the tide of the
“Tsunami” is moving fast, sweeping away
firms, mines, jobs, revenues, and liveli-
hoods. Time is of the essence and decisi-
ve action can wait no longer.
1.2 This note documents the severity of
the impact of the crisis on African econo-
mies. It attempts to portray the magnitude
of financing gaps that must be bridged
with a view to checking not only the crisis,
but most importantly preserving the basis
for high growth and poverty reduction.
The note demonstrates that while it is
important for donors to deliver on pre-
committed pledges, those alone will not
be sufficient to bridge the widening finan-
cing gaps and maintaining the growth
momentum on the continent. It especially
argues for additionality of aid, flexibility in
aid allocations and faster delivery mecha-
nisms to improve responsiveness and ali-
gnment with country-specific needs and
circumstances. It concludes with a set of
concrete recommendations for the G20,




2.1 Africa has been severely hit by the cri-
sis, with its growth rate forecasted to dip
below 3 percent in 2009 (2.8 percent) for
the first time since 2002 (Table 1). Sub-
Saharan Africa is expected to grow at a
meager 2.5 percent. Middle income coun-
tries have been hit severely due to their
relatively higher integration into the global
economy.
2.2 The slowdown in growth is primarily
due to declining trade flows. The expec-
ted short-fall in export revenues is immen-
se: USD 251 billion in 2009 and USD277
billion in 2010. Oil exporters will take the
biggest hit, with a shortfall of USD 200 bil-
lion in 2009 and USD220 in 2010 (Table
2). With exports declining faster than
imports, the trade balance will deteriorate
in most countries. 2009 and 2010 exports
have been revised downwards by 40 per-
cent. As a result, from a comfortable ove-
rall current account surplus of 2.7 percent
of GDP for both 2008 and 2007, the conti-
nent will record an overall deficit of 4.3
percent of GDP in 2009.
2.3 Capital inflows, which have been ano-
ther important driver of recent growth, are
1also declining. Similarly, most countries
are experiencing a slowdown in migrant
remittances as a result of the weakening
economies in the West and Africa’s lar-
gest economies. For example, in Kenya,
remittances have been steadily falling
since October 2008 from USD 61 million
to USD 39 million in January 2009.
Tourism receipts were down 13 percent in
the 4th quarter of 2008, compared to
2007, further undermining the country’s
efforts to build up its foreign exchange
reserve base.
2.4 The stocks of foreign exchange
reserves are deteriorating. In the DRC,
reserves are down to only a few weeks of
import cover. At this pace, many countries
will not be able to afford even basic com-
modity imports such as food, medical sup-
plies, and agricultural inputs.
2.5 Government revenues are also
expected to decline. Diversified econo-
mies will be less impacted than others.
For example, the 2009 forecasted
government revenues for Tunisia and
South Africa have been revised down-
wards by 1.2 and 0.4 percentage points,
respectively. On the other hand, highly
specialized economies such as Libya
and Algeria (oil-dependant countries) will
see government revenues decline shar-
ply by 17 and 16 percentage points, res-
pectively, in 2009.
2.6 Overall budget balances will worsen
for the continent as a whole, going from a
global budgetary surplus of 2.8 percent of
GDP in 2008 to a deficit of 5.4 percent of
GDP in 2009. The impact on the budget is
even worse for net oil-importing countries
and those with substantial food imports
because of the carry-over effects of the
high oil and food prices of the past year.
Oil exporters, for their part, are experien-
cing major declines in revenues, and this
is expected to persist through 2010. The
crisis has underscored the perils of the
excessive dependency of African econo-
mies on production and exports.
2.7 Although low-income countries (LICs)
are benefiting from the decline in oil
prices, they are experiencing difficulties
due to falling prices and demand for their
commodity exports. Current account defi-
cits are worsening. In addition, FDI and
remittances are declining. While LICs, as
a group, are forecast to grow faster than
middle income and oil-exporting countries
in 2009, their populations will be severely
affected by the crisis due to their already
relatively lower pre-crisis living standards.
2.8 The drying up of liquidity in internatio-
nal financial markets has hit the private
sector as well as governments. For
governments, attempts to raise long-term
finance through sovereign bond issue
have failed, especially in South Africa,
2while a Ghana Telecom bond issue for
USD300 million has been cancelled . The
Eurobond issues for Kenya, Nigeria,
Tanzania and Uganda have been
delayed. This has caused costly delays in
the implementation of planned public
infrastructure programs.
2.9 A number of private sector projects
across Africa have been suspended or
delayed because some investors with-
drew and the funding conditions became
more constraining due to higher spread
and lower debt-to-equity exposure (Table
3). A gas project in North Africa was sus-
pended after its approval by the Bank in
October 2008 because the financing
could not be closed. Moreover, seven
infrastructure projects, where the AfDB
has been approached to provide funding,
are currently delayed because of the cri-
sis. The financial crisis has led to an
increase in demand for AfDB funding for
private sector operations. The AfDB has
been asked to step into several projects to
provide additional funding, even in some
of which it had already gotten involved.
The Bank has recently granted two loan
extensions of EUR 70 million and USD
48.75 million, and a proposal for another
UA 229 million loan extension will be
considered soon.
Specificity of the severity of the crisis
at the country level(1)
Regional engines of growth were the first
affected
2.10 Expectedly, the large, financially
developed and open economies were the
first to be hit by the crisis through financial
markets (South Africa, Egypt) and exports
(oil for Algeria and Nigeria, and mining for
South Africa).
2.11 In South Africa, the financial sector
experienced a collapse of asset prices,
dramatic increases in the cost of capital,
and a severe contraction in lending. This
has led to sharp downturns in the retail
and manufacturing sectors. Between May
2008 and March 2009, South Africa’s
JALSH index has fallen by about 46 per-
cent and the Rand depreciated by 23 per-
cent against the US dollar. Furthermore,
the mining sector is experiencing a large
fall in output and employment, driven by
lower global demand for commodities.
2.12 Nigeria’s investment, output and
government revenues have fallen signifi-
cantly due to declining prices for hydro-
carbons (oil and gas). Oil and gas extrac-
tion account for 30 percent of the econo-
my’s GDP, over 90 percent of its exports
3
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Finance, and regional Banks (BCEAO and BEAC) in providing country-level information on the impact of the
crisis and policy responses.and a large share of government reve-
nues. While no major bank is under
immediate threat in Nigeria, the banking
sector may be exposed to rising default
risk of its clients operating in the export¬-
oriented sectors, including oil. A resulting
slowdown in bank lending will amplify the
effects of weak performance of the oil and
gas sector on growth. While food price
inflation is declining, this could be rever-
sed by the significant depreciation of its
currency. The decline in foreign exchange
reserves due to lower exports is exacer-
bated by falling remittance inflows since
the beginning of the crisis.
2.13 As the regional engines of growth
weaken, this is expected to have signifi-
cant knock-on effects on smaller neighbo-
ring economies through trade linkages
and worker remittances. For example,
remittance flows to the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) are falling due
to the slowdown in South Africa, further
exacerbating the impact of the decline in
mineral exports.
Pre-crisis success stories are not spared.
2.14 The crisis is also affecting the coun-
tries that had been experiencing several
years of sustained growth built upon
improved economic fundamentals and
prudent fiscal policies. Botswana and
Tunisia provide two instructive examples.
2.15 Botswana has experienced a sharp
decline in industrial production, export
and government revenues. It has proven
to be highly vulnerable to shocks due to
its high dependence on diamond exports
(representing 35 to 50 percent of govern-
ment revenues).
Its foreign reserves are falling rapidly, and
the fall in mineral revenues is expected to
be prolonged, limiting the government’s
ability to finance economic recovery
plans. Its growth rate is expected to
remain below 3 percent in 2009 and
2010. The crisis has underscored the criti-
cal role of export diversification in reinfor-
cing the resilience of economies to exter-
nal shocks.
2.16 Tunisia has one of the most diversi-
fied economies in Africa. Nevertheless, it
has experienced the full spectrum of the
economic downturn from contraction in
industrial production and exports to sharp
declines in government revenues and
foreign reserves. Key sectors of the eco-
nomy have been affected, from manufac-
turing to tourism. As a result, its growth
projections for 2009 have been revised
downwards by 1.5 percentage points bet-
ween November 2008 and February 2009.
Mineral resource dependent and fragile
states
2.17 Excessive specialization in minerals
has proven to be even more disastrous
4for countries with poor governance and
weak state institutions. This is the case
for the DRC and the Central African
Republic. Lower demand and prices for
commodities are compounded by high
economic and political uncertainty. Risk
aversion has induced investors to relocate
to lower risk countries, resulting in sharp
decline in foreign direct investment (FDI).
The combination of falling export reve-
nues, weak governance capacity, and a
prolonged retrenchment in investment
aggravates already widespread poverty
and threatens the stability of these fragile
states.
2.18 In the Democratic Republic of
Congo, 100,000 jobs have been lost due
to smelter closures. Foreign reserves are
down to about one week of imports; the
country will soon be unable to purchase
imported essentials such as food, fuel,
and medication.
2.19 In the Central African Republic
exports of wood and diamonds have col-
lapsed, causing large losses of employ-
ment. The Société d’Exploitation
Fforestière en Centrafrique (SEFCA) has
laid off half of its employees as its orders
were cut by half. The economy is basical-
ly on life support. Regional neighbors
have contributed CFAF 8 billion (more
than USD15m) as the government was
unable to pay the salaries of civil ser-
vants. Debt arrears are accumulating, fur-
ther undermining the country’s capacity to
mobilize external resources. This situation
is clearly threatening the stability of a
country that is just coming out of conflict.
Oil-producing countries face declining fis-
cal revenues
2.20 Several oil-producing countries have
been forced to severely curtail their public
expenditure plans, including public infra-
structure investment, due to lower fiscal
revenues. In Angola, government revenue
for 2009 is expected to be 24 percent
lower compared to 2008. The non-oil sec-
tors, such as construction, manufacturing
and services, are heavily dependent on
public sector demand and are also expec-
ted to slow down considerably. The
Angolan economy is expected to contract
by 7 percent in 2009, following a double-
digit growth rate in 2008 (15.8 percent), a
reversal of almost -23 percent.
Agriculture dependent economies
2.21 The financial crisis has amplified the
impacts of the food crisis. The deprecia-
tion of national currencies against major
reserve currencies has raised the cost of
food imports. This impact will be particu-
larly harder on economies with large food-
trade deficits. Urban populations have
been particularly affected as job opportu-
nities shrink. Attempts to subsidize food
and oil prices are unsustainable due to
5low government revenues and falling
foreign exchange reserves. Ethiopia, for
example, has been steadily losing its
reserves over the last few months. In turn,
credit to the private sector has declined
considerably since the third quarter of
2008 as the government increased its
domestic borrowing to finance the oil sub-
sidy bill. In just six months (August 2008
to February 2009) Kenya’s total usable
reserves (official plus commercial banks
holding) fell from USD 5,287 million in to
USD 4,726 million. Over the same per-
iod, Kenyan Central Bank’s reserves hol-
ding declined from 4.1 months of imports
to 3.1 months (below the statutory requi-
rement of 4 months). By end February
2009, the Kenyan shilling had depreciated
by 15.7 percent against the US dollar
relative to September 1, 2008.
3. Africa is trying, but the
scope to do more is very
limited
3.1 African governments have taken a
number of initiatives to mitigate the impact
of financial and trade shocks. However, its
limited resources are inadequate in rela-
tion to the scale of the impact. Many
governments have set up special monito-
ring units to identify the crisis’ advance
and to formulate targeted responses. In
addition, governments have introduced a
range of policy measures, including fiscal
stimulus packages, targeted assistance to
sectors, capital and exchange controls;
new regulations in the banking sectors,
and expansionary monetary policies (see
Table 4).
Fiscal stimulus packages
3.2 Emulating the example of developed
and emerging economies, some African
governments have implemented fiscal sti-
mulus plans. This includes increases in
public investment expenditures as well as
tax reductions. However, in some coun-
tries, the severity of the crisis has forced
the governments to retrench and underta-
ke a contractionary fiscal policy.
3.3 In Mauritius, the government announ-
ced a stimulus package to boost domestic
demand and increase job creation in
January 2009. This package is worth 10.4
billion of Mauritian Rupees (USD 0.3 bil-
lion), or approximately 3 percent of
Mauritius GDP. In Nigeria, the govern-
ment is contemplating using its USD 52
billion external reserves to shore up the
economy through a stimulus package.
3.4 The Liberian government undertook a
comprehensive revision of its revenue
code, proposing a 10-percent reduction in
corporate and income tax rates in a bid to
stimulate private sector activity. In addi-
tion, the government is planning to cut
regional trade tariffs by a quarter of a per-
6centage point with a view to fostering
trade within ECOWAS. The South African
government has proposed an adjustment
to personal income tax that should provi-
de middle and lower income earners with
R13.6 billion (USD 1.35 billion) in tax
relief.
3.5 In Senegal, the government lowered
budgetary expenditure by 4 percent of
GDP and priority expenditure by 0.6 per-
cent of the GDP. Similar actions were
taken in Cape Verde, Sudan and Uganda.
In Tunisia, the 2009 budget includes a
significant increase in public investments
in line with its plan to increase external
competitiveness and employment and
strengthen social protection. Similarly, in
South Africa, the government increased
funding for public investment projects with
allocation of R 690 billion (about USD 80
billion) over the next three years.
Targeted assistance to sectors
3.6 Many countries have implemented tar-
geted sectoral assistance plans to support
sectors that are considered as key growth
drivers. These measures are intended to
reduce job destruction and the loss of
sector specific capital and know-how. In
Nigeria, the government injected N70 bil-
lion into the severely weakened textile
industry. The Rwandan government
announced plans to reduce the quantity of
its tea sold through auctioning at
Mombasa and improve direct sales to
reach a target of USD 54 million tea sales
in 2009. In Uganda, the government pro-
vided assistance to the transportation sec-
tor by writing off public loans to compa-
nies.
Banking regulation and capital account
controls
3.7 Prudential capital controls in most
African banking systems have helped to
minimize contagion effects on African
banks. These controls also reduced capi-
tal outflows during the crisis. In addition,
some governments have introduced depo-
sit insurance schemes.
3.8 In Tanzania, profit repatriation has
been regulated to minimize the contagion,
as bank subsidiaries cannot automatically
transfer funds to compensate for losses in
parent banks. The Egyptian government
has established a deposit insurance fund
to boost public confidence in banking sec-
tor.
3.9 As a response to the large deprecia-
tion of their national currencies, govern-
ments have undertaken a variety of mea-
sures to defend their currency or to boost
competition. Some have attempted to
defend a managed exchange rate. In
some countries with fixed exchange rate
regimes, governments have devaluated
their currencies to boost competitiveness.
73.10 The Nigerian Central Bank had
aggressively intervened in the foreign
exchange markets to stem the slide of the
Naira. However, defending the Naira has
proven unsustainable due to declining
export revenues. Other central banks
have also attempted to defend the natio-
nal currency, but have run out of
reserves.
Expansionary monetary policy
3.11 Several countries have eased their
monetary policy by cutting interest rates
to stimulate consumption and encourage
borrowing. Examples include Botswana
where the Central Bank has cut its bank
rate by 50 basis points to 15 percent in
December 2008. Similarly the Egyptian
Central Bank has cut its benchmark inter-
est rate for the first period since April
2006. The Namibian Central Bank and the
South African Reserve Bank also reduced
their repurchase rate to stimulate borro-
wing and boost private investment and
consumption.
Bond financing of public expenditure
3.12 Some countries have financed coun-
ter-cycle expenditures via the emission of
treasury bills and bonds. In Cape Verde,
the Central Bank introduced Treasury bills
to encourage private saving to remain in
the national financial system. The Kenyan
government issued an infrastructure bond
that amounted to 18.5 billion shilling (USD
232.6 million) with 12-year maturity in
February 2009. The bond was over-sub-
scribed, a testimony to the existence of a
substantial untapped domestic saving
capacity.
4. Africa is facing a large
and growing financing gap
4.1 Notwithstanding all these laudable ini-
tiatives, it is clear that African govern-
ments do not have adequate financing
capacity to cushion populations against
the impact of the crisis and protect the
gains recorded in the past years in terms
of growth and poverty reduction. The
resources needed are immense and the
savings are limited. Conservative esti-
mates demonstrate that even full delivery
of pledged external assistance will not be
sufficient to bridge Africa’s growing finan-
cing gap.
4.2 The most important risk is that the
shortage of financing will depress invest-
ment, with damaging effects on growth,
severely undermining the continent’s abili-
ty to achieve the MDGs. Although African
countries were growing faster before the
crisis, the growth rates were still not suffi-
cient to achieve the MDGs. However, at
the moment, even preserving the pre-cri-
sis growth rates seems untenable for
many countries due to a shortage of
financing.
84.3 We have estimated that for the conti-
nent to maintain its growth momentum of
2007, an infusion of large amounts of
external financing will be needed to bridge
the investment-saving gap. Under the
conservative scenario of maintaining
growth at the pre-crisis level, the resour-
ce gap amounts to USD 50 billion for
2009 and USD 56 billion for 2010. But of
course, maintaining the growth rates at
the pre-crisis levels will not allow African
countries to make substantial progress in
reducing poverty. To raise growth rates to
the 7 percent minimum deemed necessa-
ry to achieve the MDGs, the continent
would need an infusion of about USD117
billion in 2009 and USD 130 billion in
2010 to bridge the investment-savings
gap. The bulk of the investment would
naturally go into infrastructure. The Africa
Infrastructure Country Diagnostic study(2)
estimated Africa’s infrastructure needs at
USD 75.5 billion per year for the next 10
years, including capital expenditure
(USD38.1 billion) and operations and
maintenance (USD37.4 billion) (see also
Figure A1 and Table A1).
4.4 Our estimates of the financing gap are
in the same range as the ones generated
by sister institutions, but much higher than
the sums pledged by the development
assistance community before the crisis
(Figure 1). The 2005 Gleneagles Summit
committed to raising aid to Africa by USD
25 billion per year until 2010. This is vir-
tually half the amounts needed to only
allow African countries to maintain their
pre-crisis growth rates, which are defini-
tely not sufficient to bring the continent
anywhere closer to meeting the MDGs.
4.5 Therefore, new assistance initiatives
must bring additional resources. Delivery
of pre-committed aid will not make a dent
into the hardships experienced by the
continent as a result of the crisis. At least
USD 117 billion are needed to propel the
continent into a higher growth path to give
it a chance to reach the MDGs.
5. Recommendations
5.1 Urgency of action: The severity of the
crisis calls for swift action, with the sense
of urgency as demonstrated in the rapid
setup and delivery of bailout plans for
banks and corporations in advanced eco-
nomies.
5.2 Scaling up resources: Early initiatives
to stem off the impact of the crisis have
typically involved a reallocation of existing
resources. This is vastly inadequate to
address the impact of the crisis. Therefo-
re, the following is recommended:
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Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda,
Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.• New initiatives must involve “additionali-
ty” of aid over and above pre-committed
pledges. Donors should pledge to provi-
de 0.7 percent of their domestic stimu-
lus packages to assist poorer countries,
using existing multilateral channels.
• Donors must agree to increase the
resource envelopes of the Bretton
Woods Institutions and major regional
development banks to scale up support
for countries. Resources available to
the IMF, particularly through the ESF
and PRGF, should be increased.
• IFIs have accepted that they must play
a counter-cyclical role. But they will
need the resources to do so.
Shareholders must move quickly to
increase the capital of major regional
banks to allow them to help fill the
growing financing gaps faced by
member states. In particular we want to
see an early review of capital adequacy
of the African Development Bank.
• Shareholders and donors must quickly
agree to streamline aid delivery
processes in BWIs and major regional
banks to increase the speed and
effectiveness of crisis response
initiatives.
• The Debt Sustainability Framework
should be reviewed within the context of
the crisis, and the closure of access to
credit. Those countries that are able to
service the payments should be
permitted to access less or non-
concessional resources.
5.3 Increase and sustain investment in
infrastructure at national and regional
levels. Africa already faces a fundamental
infrastructure gap at both national and
regional level. Without filling that gap and
promoting economic integration, Africa will
not be able to benefit from the eventual
global recovery. To achieve this goal:
• Donors must commit to increasing
funding for public infrastructure in
Africa.
• Fiscal/macroeconomic policy frame-
works need to be more flexible to
provide African governments with
adequate policy space to increase bud-
getary allocations to public infrastructu-
re.
• The private sector must take a leading
role in infrastructure investment and the
management of infrastructure services,
including through public-private partner-
ships.
• Governments must explore and
encourage management arrangements
that accelerate cost recovery, including
fee-for-service schemes in public
goods.
105.4 Trade financing and trade facilitation
must be at the center of the short-term
and long-term action plan. In particular,
the following is needed:
• The G20 should resist taking protectio-
nist measures in response to the crisis,
and any that are put in place must be
strictly time limited.
• They should commit to an early conclu-
sion of an ambitious and development
oriented Doha Round.
• Shareholders need to agree to increase
financing capacity of the BWIs and
regional development banks to provide
trade finance facilities.
• The G20 must provide technical,
financial and political support to the Aid
for Trade Initiative.
• The donor community should establish
a special Trade Facilitation Training
Fund (TFTF) for technical assistance to
African countries to improve their
preparedness for trade negotiations.
5.5 Protecting the poor and the vulne-
rable: It is critical to preserve the modest
gains in poverty reduction and access to
basic social services achieved before the
crisis. In this respect, donors and govern-
ments are called to:
• Maintain adequate levels of public
spending on health, education
(including special programs such as
school feeding programs), nutrition, and
sanitation.
• Ensure adequate and stable funding for
global initiatives such as the Global
Fund for the fight against HIV/AIDS,
malaria, and tuberculosis, thereby
avoiding large numbers of preventable
deaths.
• Provide financial support for social
safety nets to protect the poor, the
unemployed and the socially marginali-
zed. Such safety nets should be desi-
gned to allow easy countercyclical
adjustment to cushion the poor against
the impact of shocks.
5.6 Increasing policy space and flexibility,
speeding up aid delivery. In addition to
scaling up aid, donors need to support
reforms in the aid delivery processes so
as to:
• Increase flexibility and tailor aid alloca-
tions and delivery processes to recipient
country’s circumstances, including
fragility, narrow fiscal space, and limited
technical and institutional capacity.
• Review the current performance based
aid allocation models used to better
reflect the diversity of needs and
11circumstances, in particular the position
of fragile states, and the fundamental
need to promote economic integration
in Africa.
• Increase predictability of aid to facilitate
planning and implementation of
development programs. Delivery
should be frontloaded and more provi-
ded in fast disbursing program rather
than project support.
• Increase policy space by greater focus
on results and less on prior conditionali-
ty, and promoting country ownership of
programs through greater participation
of recipients in dialogue and consulta-
tion.
5.7 The crisis provides an opportunity to
improve global governance for more
transparency, accountability, and equitable
representation. In particular:
• Africa and other developing regions
must be given adequate voice and
representation in order to advance their
development interests;
• Voting weights at the IFIs, which are
currently based on shareholdings, must
be revisited to remove the bias in favor
of rich countries and to recognize the
importance of the IFIs to achievement
of the development plans of its mem-
bers.
• Due attention should be given to the
role of the regional institutions as
representative of their regional member
countries.
5.8 The role of the state
• Advanced and emerging countries, as
well as African countries are urged to
strengthen the regulation of financial
systems to increase efficiency while
minimizing risk;
• Any efficiency gains from liberalization
of financial systems and other markets
must be balanced against the social
benefits of regulation in terms of finan-
cial stability and equitable participation
in the market economy;
• Donors and multilateral institutions must
increase assistance for capacity buil-
ding in African countries, notably
through targeted technical assistance
programs.
5.9 Recovery of Africa’s stolen wealth:
Billions of dollars of stolen wealth from
the continent, including funds smuggled
through embezzlement of borrowed
money, are banked in Western financial
institutions and tax havens. The ability of
poorer countries to develop a sound reve-
nue base and provide basic services is
thereby compromised. In addition to
enhanced action in Africa to counter cor-
ruption we recommend:
12• Governments in advanced economies
to enforce transparency in financial
transactions in their banking systems to
stem off illegal transfers of funds from
the continent.
• The international community invests
coordinated financial intelligence and
resolute political will, as it has in the
war against terrorism, in efforts at pre-
venting the smuggling of African assets,
to track down and recover stolen
wealth.
* In this respect, the G20 is urged to
support the UN Stolen Assets
Recovery initiative and other similar
initiatives aimed at preventing money
laundering, tax evasion, and capital
flight.
5.10 Climate Change: The present finan-
cial crisis adds to Africa’s increasing bur-
den of coping with changes brought about
by global warming which is an external
shock. It reduces resources for adapta-
tion and mitigation programs in African
countries. It is critical that adequate new
resources be made available to support
adaptation and that these be additional to
existing development programs.
5.11 The political will of Africa’s develop-
ment partners will be severely tested in
these moments of economic crisis.
Advanced economies were able to mobi-
lize massive amounts of funds for fiscal
stimulus and bailout packages to rescue
banks and corporations in the wake of
the crisis. With much less resources than
these rescue packages, the donor com-
munity can preserve its credibility as a




















































































































Table 1: Real GDP Growth (%): Data before and after Crisis
Real GDP growth GDP change
Before crisis After crisis After crisis









































































































































































Source: AEO 2009 Projections. World economic outlook Database, October 2008 and FAO
Note: (p) Projections; (e) Estimation
Real GDP growth GDP change
Before crisis After crisis After crisis


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Exports of Goods ( US$ Billion)
Current Account Balance
(As % of GDP)
Estimated
Shortfall After Crisis After Crisis Before Crisis Before Crisis
2009(p) 2010(p) 2009(p) 2010(p) 2009(p) 2010(p) 2009(p) 2010(p) 2009(p) 2010(p)18
Source: AEO 2009 Projections. World economic outlook Database, October 2008;
Notes: Data for Zimbabwe, Somalia, Sao Tome, Guinea Bissau, Eritrea and Comoros are not available.































































































































































































































































































Exports of Goods ( US$ Billion)
Current Account Balance
(As % of GDP)
Estimated
Shortfall After Crisis After Crisis Before Crisis Before Crisis
2009(p) 2010(p) 2009(p) 2010(p) 2009(p) 2010(p) 2009(p) 2010(p) 2009(p) 2010(p)19
Table 3: Selected projects expected to be cancelled or postponed











In December 2008 the Government postponed the date of submission
of tenders for the modernization of Skikda and El Harrach refineries to
1Q 2009. These projects could be delayed.
Out of six mines scheduled to start in 2009 three mining companies
are having difficulties mobilizing funds needed to begin operations.
Private financing of Gilgel Gibe Hydro III Project to fill the financing
gap is in danger. JP Morgan had earlier expressed interest but has
withdrawn due to the crisis.
Attempted sale of Volta Aluminum Company Limited (VALCO), an alu-
minum smelter, collapsed due to withdrawal of the Brazilian consor-
tium from the deal
Investments delayed in mining projects
Construction projects may be delayed
Petronas decided to put its Port Sudan refinery project on hold.
Rio Tinto and Vodacom have postponed investments in mining pro-
jects
Hasdrubal gas project and Enfidha deep sea port project are likely to
be delayed
14 medium scale companies closed in 2008 and 15 more expected to
close in 1Q 2009, Government will divert money from planned road
projects to other sectors.20
Table 4: Crisis mitigation strategies in selected countries





• The Central Bank cut its bank rate by 50 basis points to 15% in December
2008.
• In the face of uncertainty as to the duration of the global economic
slowdown, the cushion provided by the foreign exchange reserves may not
be sufficient; some increase in borrowing is expected
Reductions in spending targeting not only the development budget, but also some recur-
rent expenditure items, such as personnel emoluments and the cost of travel.
• Dialogue with the IMF which adjusted the criteria of performance of the PSI
• Careful management of the interest rates and the budget
Development of the Treasury bills to encourage the saving to remain in the national finan-
cial system.
• Egyptian Government has announced a number of crisis mitigating
measures:
- Ministry of Trade & Industry EGP7 billion to boost exports and local
production
- Crisis package for tourism sector, including tax-exemption for charter
flights, offering of free nights in hotels, etc
- Establishing deposit insurance fund (to boost confidence in banking
sector)
- Parliament approved legislation on integrated supervision of non-bank
financial sector (i.e., capital market, insurance, mortgage finance, financial
leasing, and factoring) in January
- 2nd phase of the Financial Sector Reform Program, with expected joint ABD-World
Bank financing, discussed between the Prime Minister, the Minister of Investment,
and the Governor of the Central Bank in January. Program at strengthening role of
the financial sector by expanding the volume of bank lending, and enhancing SME’s
access to credit.
Egyptian Central Bank cut its benchmark interest rate for the first time since April 2006.
The overnight deposit rate was lowered 100 basis points to 10.5%, while the lending
rate was cut by the same amount to 12.5%.
• The Central Bank reduced the threshold for investments in Treasury Bills in the primary
market from the current Kshs 1 million to Kshs 0.1 million from January 2009 to induce
small investors.
• The Kenyan government issued infrastructure bond that amounted to 18.5 billion
shilling (USD 232.6 million) with 12-year maturity in February 2009.21





• Nothing dedicated specifically to the crisis.
• Vigilance on BoP (remittances and level of reserves).
• Government is making a comprehensive revision of its Revenue Code which proposes
a 10% reduction of corporate and income tax rates in a bid to stimulate economic
growth.
Government is planning to cut the regional trade tariff from 1% to 0.75% to accelerate
trade within ECOWAS.
Government announced in January 2009 a stimulus package to bolster economic growth,
increase jobs and boost purchasing power as a response to the global financial crisis. The
package will provide Mauritian Rupees 10.4 billion, equivalent to about 3% of GDP.
• In a bid to stimulate trade, the Moroccan government has taken a series of measures
to re-energize the markets:
- Allowing companies to buy back their own shares without a minimum set price in the
event that their share prices drop below a certain level.
- The possibility for insurance companies to hold up to 60% of their listed shares to
cover their liabilities, as opposed to the previous ceiling 50%.
• The 2.8 trillion naira (22.6 billion dollar) 2009 budget submitted to the National
Assembly is noticeably heavy on recurrent expenditure and light on capital spending
and investment. The government is now mulling to use its USD 52 billion external
reserves to shore up the economy through a stimulus package.
• Launch of a Presidential Steering Committee on the Global Economic Crisis in
January 2009. The Committee is responsible for developing a framework to respond to
the global crisis.
• Nigeria and Dubai signed in January 2009 a memorandum of understanding worth
USD 16 billion for infrastructure investments.
• Government announced plan to suspend the 5% excise duty on some goods
manufactured such as juices, instant noodles and non-alcoholic drinks, aiming to
support its stressed industry and avert job losses.
• Government decided to inject N70 billion into the wobbly textile industry through
guarantees in February 2009.
• Nigerian government imposed foreign exchange controls to stem the slide in the
Naira. These measures include:
- All foreign exchange purchases from the central bank window are only to be used for
customers, and not on the interbank foreign exchange market.
The net open foreign exchange position of banks is reduced to 1% of shareholders’ funds,
down from 20% in mid-December 2008.22





• The recent Presidential State of the Nation address (6th February, 2009) has taken
note of the impact of the ongoing financial crisis to the economy. The government has
flagged measures underway to avert the crisis that include:
- Increased funding for public investment projects with allocation of R 690 billion
(about USD 80 billion) over the next three years;
- Intensification of public sector employment programs;
- Adoption of industrial financing and incentive instruments to assist firms in distress,
and lastly;
- Sustained and expansion of government social expenditure.
- Financing of these measures is informed to include support from development
finance institutions as well as partnership with the private sector
- Proposed tax adjustments to personal income tax providing middle and lower
income earners with R13.6 billion in tax relief.
• The South African Reserve Bank cut the repurchase rate, its benchmark interest rate,
by 100 basis points to 10.5%, the biggest reduction in more than five years.
• The Regional Government of Southern Sudan has ordered a 10% salary cut for all
senior government officials and a clampdown on the payment of hotel costs for officials
who do not have their own housing.
• Tunisian Government has taken a number of steps in view of the financial crisis:
- a Commission to ensure crisis surveillance has been established
- 2009 budget includes a significant increase in public investments along with
measures to increase external competitiveness and employment and strengthen
social protection
• Central Bank relaxing monetary policy stance, with Dinar money market rate falling
from about 5.2% in December to 4.65% in January 2009
Central Bank reduced its key interest rate by 75 basis points, from 5.25% to 4.50% in
February 2009.
• Government has assisted the troubled Uganda Transport Operators and Drivers
Association (Utoda) by writing off nearly half of the accumulated Shs1.7 billion debt that
it owes Kampala City Council (KCC).23
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